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THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE UNDER THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS  
Charalampos Stylogiannis* 
 
Abstract: The right to strike has been largely acknowledged as an indispensable element of 
collective bargaining, and as one of the most essential means by which workers can preserve 
their socio-economic rights. It is safeguarded by international and European human rights 
instruments, and is enshrined in a number of states’ constitutions, including several parties to 
the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’). Within the legal framework of the 
ECHR, in the seminal cases of Demir and Baykara v Turkey and Enerji v Turkey the 
European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’ or 'the Court') acknowledged the significance of 
both the right to collective bargaining and to strike as vital features of the freedom of trade 
unions association, covered by article 11 ECHR. Nevertheless, in RMT v UK, the ECtHR 
mitigated the cause for enthusiasm produced by its previous decisions. This article assesses 
the extent to which the right to strike is protected in the ECHR by referring to the recent 
judicial developments within the context of the Convention. 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
‘The only thing workers have to bargain with is their skill or their labour. 
Denied the right to withhold it as a last resort, they become powerless. 
The strike is therefore not a breakdown of collective bargaining; it is the  
indispensable cornerstone of that process.’ (Paul Clark, U.S. Labour Historian, 1989) 
 
Let us imagine a legal universe of labour relations where the right to strike would not 
constitute a legitimate means by which workers can secure fair remuneration and working 
conditions. The imminent risk involved in such a hypothesis is that we could return to an era 
of ‘sweated labour’,1 where long hours, low wages, and hazardous working conditions would 
be inseparable features of the industrial and political sphere.2 This scenario is premised on the 
notion that there is an asymmetry in bargaining power between an employer and a worker, 
such that ‘in the absence of the right to strike, the right to collective bargain is no more than a 
right to collective begging’.3 Fortunately, the description of this society belongs to the past, at 
least to a certain extent, and hopefully it will remain there.  
Contemporarily the right to strike has been broadly acknowledged as an indispensable 
component of collective bargaining, and simultaneously as one of the most essential means 
																																																						
* LLM, University College London. This paper is dedicated to the ones I love the most: My parents 
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1 Such working conditions were dominant in Western Europe and other industrialised countries during the 19th 
century.  
2 Tonia Novitz, International and European Protection of the Right to Strike: A Comparative Study of Standards 
Set by the International Labour Organization, the Council of Europe and the European Union (OUP 2013) 120. 
3 Keith Ewing and John Hendy QC, ‘The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara’ (2010) 39 ILJ 10.  
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by which workers can preserve their socio-economic rights. It is safeguarded by international 
and European human rights instruments,4 and is enshrined in a number of states’ 
constitutions, including many of those which are party to the ECHR.5 Despite the fact that 
this right is not explicitly recognised in any international labour convention, the supervisory 
bodies of the International Labour Organisation (‘ILO’) have safeguarded the entitlement to 
strike by reading it into the provisions of ILO No 87 on the Freedom of Association.6 Relying 
on these specific provisions, the ILO’s supervisory bodies have generated substantial case-
law covering the scope and meaning of the right.   
These principles have been transferred into the rulings of the ECtHR to a considerable 
degree. In the landmark cases of Demir and Baykara7and Enerji8 the Court recognised the 
significance of both the right to collective bargain and to strike as vital features of the 
freedom of association in the form of trade unions, protected by article 11 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’).9 Such an acknowledgment generated a surge of 
enthusiasm amongst a plethora of scholars and trade unionists. Ewing and Hendy 
characterised the case of Demir as an ‘epoch making ruling’,10 while Dorssemont describes 
the outcome in Enerji as a ‘judicial revolution’,11 due to the 'U-turn' of the Court’s approach 
in relation to the right to strike. It has nevertheless produced an immense debate over the 
precise extent of the protection of the right to strike. This occurs because national measures 
restricting its exercise are relatively frequent and extensive.12 Within the context of the 
ECHR such measures have been challenged in many instances before the Court, with the 
impact of its rulings becoming apparent at the national level of the contracting states.13 At the 
same time, some of the ECtHR’s judgments have given rise to a significant amount of 
																																																						
4 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 3 January 1976) 999 UNTS 3 (ICESCR), art 6; European Social Charter (adopted 18 October 1961, 
entered into force 26 February 1965) ETS 3 (ESC), art 6; European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights 
[2012] OJ C 326/391 (CFREU), art 28. 
5 See for example Constitution of Greece, art 23(1). 
6 ILO Convention 87 on the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 1948 (adopted 9 
July 1948, entered into force 4 July 1950) (ILO Convention 87). 
7 Demir and Baykara v Turkey App no 34503/97 (ECHR, 12 November 2008). 
8 Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v Turkey App no 68959/01 (ECHR, 21 April 2009). 
9 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 November 1950, 
entered into force 3 September 1953) ETS 5 (ECHR). 
10 Ewing and Hendy (n 3) 41. 
11 Filip Dorssemont, ‘How the European Court of Human Rights gave us Enerji to cope with Laval and Viking’ 
in Marie-Ange Moraeu (ed), Before and After the Economic Crisis: What Implications for the ‘European Social 
Model’ (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2014) 217, 220. 
12 Mimi Zou, ‘Freestanding Right or a Means to an End-The Right to Strike in the ILO and EU Legal 
Frameworks’ (2012) 15 TCLR 101. 
13 See for example, Niklas Bruun, ‘The Finnish Supreme Court recognizes the impact of European Court of 
Human Rights case-law on national strike law’ (2011) 17(4) Transfer 577–580. 
DOI: 10.14324/111.2052-1871.082 
 
 144 
scholarly literature and reflection regarding the level of protection that has being afforded to 
the right to strike.  
This article seeks to examine, from a human rights perspective, the degree of 
protection of the right to strike under article 11 ECHR. Section B will assess whether article 
11 ECHR offers any possibility for reading into its provisions a general right to strike. It will 
scrutinise the initial reluctance of the ECtHR to proceed to such an interpretation, and thus to 
adequately safeguard the right at issue. Section C will discuss the problematic background 
from which the Demir and Baykara judgment emerged while considering the case’s impact 
on the protection of the right to strike. Section D will critically examine the decision in RMT 
v UK, in which the ECtHR appeared to displace any optimism its previous jurisprudence had 
generated. It will focus on the UK’s problematic pre-industrial notices which are necessary 
for striking workers to escape tortious liability, and on the Court’s classification of secondary 
action as an ‘accessory’, rather than a core aspect of trade unions’ activity. Section E 
discusses the importance of the right to strike as a human right. It will be argued that its 
enhanced protection can result in the promotion of human rights for both those taking part in 
the industrial action and those who are not formally engaged in the dispute. Finally, it will 
discuss why the ECHR constitutes the 'safest' route through which individuals and trade 
unions can challenge breaches vis-à-vis the right to strike.  
 
B. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERPRETATION 
OF ARTICLE 11 OF THE ECHR: THE COURT’S INITIAL RELUCTANCE 
It is true that until relatively recently the ECHR was thought to constitute an instrument for 
ensuring civil and political entitlements. In the course of adopting its human rights 
instruments, the Council of Europe drew an apparent distinction between civil and political 
rights enshrined in the ECHR on the one hand and the socio-economic rights contained in the 
European Social Charter (‘ESC’) on the other. Hence, as a socio-economic right, the ECHR 
does not recognize in any specific way the right to bargain collectively, let alone the right to 
strike.  
As Dorssemont points out, by virtue of this absence, the only prospect for judicial 
recognition of a right to strike derives from article 11 ECHR, which guarantees the freedom 
of association in a rather openly-worded form.14 This article provides that ‘the right to 
																																																						
14 Filip Dorssemont, ‘The Right to Take Collective Action under Article 11 ECHR’ in Filip Dorssemont and 
Klaus Lörcher and Isabelle Schömann (eds), The European Convention on Human Rights and the Employment 
Relation (Hart 2013) 333, 334. 
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freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others’ includes ‘the right 
to form and to join trade unions for the protection of their interests’.15 Dorssemont argues that 
this approach – a generic recognition – essentially differs from the method in which the right 
to organise is construed in more specialised international instruments.16 Within such 
instruments this right is fleshed out as an entitlement that stems from the freedom of 
association.17 For instance, under the ESC, the right to collective action is interpreted as 
intertwined with the right to collectively bargain,18 while its provision on the freedom of 
association is silent with regard to collective action/strike.19 Having said that and bearing in 
mind both the non-existence of any stand-alone acknowledgment of a right to strike and the 
presence of a specific right to form and join a trade union, the question that naturally arises is 
whether article 11 offers the legal space for reading into its provisions ‘a number of corollary 
rights regarded as inherent aspects of the more generic freedom of association’.20 
Dorssemont, in considering the wording of the aforementioned provisions, admits that the 
possibilities for such an evolution are limited.21 He stresses that the ‘right to form and join a 
trade union’ purely rephrases the key principles of the freedom of association and for that 
reason the scope of article 11 appears to be construed in a way that covers only the 
individual, rather than  the collective dimension of the right to organise.22 This narrow 
approach generates several concerns in relation to the protection of trade unions’ interests, 
and more specifically to the exercise of the right to collective action. 
Fortunately for the protection of human rights, at least within the context of the 
ECHR, the mere phrasing of a provision does not reveal the whole spectrum of the protection 
afforded under a particular right. Therefore, in order to assess the status of the right to strike 
under the ECHR, a thorough examination of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence is essential. 
1.  The Court’s restrictive approach towards the interpretation of article 11 ECHR 
As mentioned above the ECHR has, since its inception, been seen as an instrument for 
ensuring primarily civil and political rights. Even though the official position of the Council 
of Europe is premised on the very notion of interdependence, indivisibility and interrelation 
																																																						
15 ECHR, art 11. 
16 Filip Dorssemont, ‘The Right to Form and to Join Trade Unions for the Protection of his Interests under 
Article 11ECHR: An Attempt to ‘’to Digest’’ the Case Law (1975-2009) of the European Court on Human 
Rights’ (2010) 1 ELJ 186. 
17 ibid. 
18 ESC, art 6(4). 
19 ibid art 5; see also ICESCR, art 8; ILO Convention No 87; ILO Convention 98 on the Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining 1949 (adopted 1 July 1949, entered into force 18 July 1951) (ILO Convention 98). 
20 Dorssemont (n 14) 334. 
21 ibid 335. 
22 ibid. 
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of human rights, according to Novitz, there was a notable ‘disparity between this rhetorical 
claim and the actual reality’,23 regarding the protection of socio-economic rights and in 
particular the right to strike. During the entire 20th century, the discrepancy between theory 
and practice was demonstrated by the reluctance of the (then) European Commission on 
Human Rights (‘ECoHR’), and more recently by the ECtHR, to identify ‘a hard core of 
means’24 that the parties to the Convention should secure in order to permit trade unions to 
preserve their interests under the scope of article 11 ECHR. 
The Court in a number of cases during the 1970s adopted a rather restrictive 
interpretation, by merely emphasizing that article 11 imposes a duty on contracting states to 
provide mechanisms that allow trade unions to represent their members; it did not make any 
particular reference to the methods by which this was to be done.25 Consequently, the Court 
ruled against trade unions which sought to guarantee their interests vis-à-vis the rights to 
consultation, collective bargaining and strike.26 Hendy and Ewing argue that this reluctance 
can in part be attributed to the existence of the ESC, in relation to which states parties are 
able to choose freely the specific provisions that they are prepared to accept.27 In the early 
case of National Union of Belgian Police,28 it was held that article 6(1) ESC cannot be 
construed in a manner that gives rise to a ‘real right to consultation’ and that, even if it did so, 
this did not mean that article 11 ECHR should be interpreted as such.29 The Court relied on 
the traditional dichotomy between civil liberties and socio-economic rights.30 As Novitz 
rightly points out, it seems doubtful that the drafters of the ESC envisaged that the 
mechanism would not strengthen the protection of trade unions’ interests; rather, it would 
offer the ECtHR a good reason to construe article 11 in a more protective way.31 For instance, 
The ECtHR had the chance to trace a link between the freedom of association and the right to 
collectively bargain but did not engage in such considerations. 
The approach in National Union of Belgian Police proved to be damaging for trade 
unions in the process of challenging limitations on the exercise of the right to strike which did 
not infringe the equal treatment principle. This became apparent in the subsequent case of 
Schmidt and Dahlström, where state officials and individual members of Swedish trade unions 
																																																						
23 Novitz (n 2) 180. 
24 Dorssemont (n 11) 221. 
25 See Michael Forde, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and Labor Law’ (1983) 31 AJCL 301–332. 
26 See also Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union v. Sweden App no 5614/72 (ECHR 2, 6 February 1976). 
27 Ewing and Hendy (n 3) 3. 
28 National Union of Belgian Police v Belgium App no 4464/70 (ECHR, 27 October 1975). 
29 ibid [38].  
30 Novitz (n 2) 132. 
31 ibid. 
DOI: 10.14324/111.2052-1871.082 
 
 147 
tried to challenge the lawfulness of restrictions on the right to strike under article 11 ECHR.32 
It was held that the right to strike was one of the most important methods by which workers 
can protect their interests. It went on, however, to add that such a right was by no means the 
only avenue to do so; there were other ways for the applicants to equally defend their 
occupational rights.33 Plainly, the Court not only treated the right to strike as an important, 
rather than an essential 'tool' in the hands of workers, but also failed to interpret it as an 
entitlement ‘expressly enshrined in Article 11’.34 What is surprising with this particular case 
is that the decision was concluded with reference to the principles protected under both the 
ILO and the ESC. In addition, the ECtHR’s argument relating to alternatives to the right to 
strike is also open to doubt. Industrial actions are meant to be detrimental for every employer. 
As Davies states, ‘the more harm they cause, the more efficacious they are expected to be in 
convincing the employer to make concessions’.35 Thus, alternative means might not be as 
effective as the act of striking.  
Overall, the Court’s ‘guarded language’36 in its early jurisprudence regarding article 
11 constituted an impenetrable barrier for trade unions and individual workers to assert their 
work-related interests under the Convention. The reluctance of the Court to recognize the 
importance of the right for the enjoyment of freedom of association appeared to come into 
contrast with the principles enshrined in other international instruments, like the ESC. 
Thankfully, cases such as Schmidt and Dahlström appear to have been isolated setbacks and 
have not been prohibitive with regard to ensuring a more effective protection of collective 
rights collective rights derived from the ECHR. 
    2.  Demir and Baykara v Turkey: The 'U-Turn' in the court’s jurisprudence 
As Ewing noted, the Court’s early case-law with respect to the right to strike meant that few 
could have foreseen the complainant’s success in Demir and Baykara.37 But already in 2002 
the Court seemed to adopt a considerably divergent approach in UNISON.38 There, it was 
acknowledged for the first time – even though the Court reiterated the mantra that recourse to 
strike action was simply an important, rather than an essential means to preserve worker’s 
rights – that any constraint on the right to strike ‘must be regarded as a restriction on the 
																																																						
32 Schmidt and Dahlström v Sweden App no 5589/72 (ECHR, 6 February 1976). 
33 ibid [33]. 
34 ibid [36]. 
35 Anne Davies ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ’ (2008) 37 ILJ 
143. 
36 Dorssemont (n 24) 331. 
37 Keith Ewing, ‘The Implications of Wilson and Palmer’ (2003) 32 ILJ 3. 
38 UNISON v UK (Admissibility) App no 53574/99 (ECHR, 10 January 2002). 
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applicant’s power to protect [the member’s] interests and therefore discloses a restriction … 
under the first paragraph of Article 11’.39 Although the statutory restriction in question was 
found to be justified under article 11(2) because it pursued a legitimate aim necessary in a 
democratic society, this shift in jurisprudence constituted a noteworthy development.40 The 
approach in UNISON was adopted in subsequent cases41 and, as Ewing mentions, the right to 
strike within the context of the Convention emerged as having a bizarre ‘twilight status’: 
whilst it was not formally recognised, at the same time, the Court was prepared to recognise 
the unlawfulness of restrictions on the right regarding article 11(1), which had to be justified 
under the ambit of article 11(2).42  
Undoubtedly, this approach appeared much more promising than the one adopted in 
earlier cases, such as Schmidt and Dahlström. Such a view can also be supported by the 
Grand Chamber’s wording in the subsequent ruling of Wilson and Palmer.43 While this case 
did not concern the right to strike, it is important for a different reason. The ECtHR 
acknowledged that the right to strike is an essential alternative to force an employer to 
bargain collectively.44 In other words, it was accepted that the right to strike is an important 
feature of the entitlement to collective bargaining. This interrelationship was demonstrated a 
few months later, in one of the most significant decisions of the Court in the area of labour 
rights. 
According to Ewing and Hendy, the Court’s prior approach was shifted radically in 
November 2008, in the landmark case of Demir and Baykara.45 This significance of this case 
extended beyond the specific decision, residing in the ECtHR’s inclination to re-determine 
previous authority regarding article 11 by reference to the Convention as a 'living instrument' 
that has to adapt to societal changes, also emphasising the ability to interpret article 11 in 
light of other international instruments.46 
The applicants in Demir and Baykara were members of a Turkish civil service union 
who entered into a collective agreement that concerned working conditions with a local 
municipal authority. The latter failed to comply with certain obligations under the agreement 
and consequently the union brought civil proceedings against it. At first instance, the Turkish 
																																																						
39 ibid [37]. 
40 ibid. See also: Federation of Offshore Worker’s Trade Unions and Others v Norway App no 38190/97 
(ECHR, 27 June 2002). 
41 See Dilek v Turkey App nos 74611/02, 26876/02 and 27628/02 (ECHR, 30 January 2008). 
42 Dorssemont (n 36) 18. 
43 Wilson, National Union of Journalists v UK App no 30668/96 (ECHR, 2 July 2002) 
44 ibid [41]. 
45 Ewing and Hendy (n 3) 3. 
46 Charles Barrow, ‘Demir and Baykara v. Turkey: breathing life into article 11’ (2010) 4 EHRLR 420. 
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District Court found for the union, but its decision was quashed on appeal by the Court of 
Cassation, ruling that even though civil servants were entitled to join trade unions, the union 
in question did not have the necessary authority to enter into a collective agreement under 
domestic law. On second appeal the Court of Cassation reiterated its position by further 
holding that the trade union did not acquire a legal status due to its failure to comply with 
prescribed requirements to establish its competences. The union lodged an application before 
the ECtHR claiming that the Turkish Government was in breach of article 11 ECHR by 
refusing them the exercise of their entitlements, namely to form a trade union and engage in 
collective bargaining. Both the Chamber of the Second Section and, at a later stage, the 
Grand Chamber unanimously held that the Turkish authorities were in breach of article 11 
‘on account of the interference with the right of the applicants, as municipal civil servants, to 
form a trade union [and] of the annulment ex tunc of the collective agreement entered 
between the trade union, following collective bargaining with the employing authority’.47 
Distancing itself from its previous jurisprudence, the Court explicitly recognised that the right 
to bargain collectively is an inherent feature of article 11 ECHR. In doing so, as Lörcher 
argues, ‘it opened up the whole Convention to a more socially oriented interpretation’.48  
As stated, the significance of the case lies in the approach adopted by the Strasbourg 
Court. It implemented a living instrument/evolutive interpretation by relying on a 
consolidated approach to construing the ECHR in light of other international instruments and 
common practices amongst the member states of the Council of Europe.49 The Court 
emphasized that the scope and content of article 11 could be determined by using relevant 
international treaties,50 irrespective of whether a respondent member had actually ratified that 
particular international instrument.51 Indeed, in the course of assessing if the right to 
																																																						
47 Demir and Baykara (n 7) [183]. 
48 Klaus Lörcher, ‘The New Social Dimension in the Jurisprudence of the European Court on Human Rights 
(ECHR): The Demir and Baykara Judgment, its Methodology and Follow-up’ in Filip Dorssemont and Klaus 
Lörcher and Isabelle Schomann, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Employment Relation 
(Hart 2013) 4. 
49 ibid 5. 
50 Ewing and Hendy (n 3) 6. 
51 Demir and Baykara (n 7) [66]. It may be questionable as to whether such an approach is compatible with 
customary rules on treaty interpretation. As a multilateral treaty the ECHR constitutes part of public 
international law, and thus it is governed by the principles enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties 1969 (VCLT). However, according to scholars such as Pieter van Dijk and others (Pieter Van Dijk and 
others, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (Kluwer Law International 1998) 72) 
the principles of the VCLT do not offer clear solutions to all the problems emerging from treaty interpretation. 
The ECHR cannot be considered as a traditional treaty of ‘reciprocal nature’ concluded to generate only 
horizontal obligations between the contracting states. The Convention as a human rights treaty possesses a 
special standard-setting character which lies in the fact that states assume obligations (vertical in a sense) to 
safeguard individuals’ fundamental rights. Consequently, due to the particular nature of the Convention, the 
Court has developed other interpretative approaches to bridge the gaps. One of these is the ‘living-instrument’ 
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collective bargaining could be read into article 11, special reference was made to 
international labour principles and relevant case-law; especially ILO Convention 98, article 6 
ESC and article 28 European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘CFREU’). All these 
instruments contain similar language regarding the protection of trade unions.52 
It is arguable that the living instrument espoused by the Court is not novel; it was not 
the first time it referred to international standards or to the jurisprudence of relevant bodies. It 
is recalled that in the case of Schmidt and Dahlström the verdict was reached by reference to 
ILO standards and the requirements of the ESC. Interestingly enough, the same stance had 
been adopted in other earlier cases touching upon social and economic rights.53 In Demir and 
Baykara, the Court affirmed the well-established notion that ‘the Convention is a living-
instrument ... which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’.54 This 
approach offers the Court the opportunity to protect a wider range of fundamental rights, 
which the Convention’s drafters may not have thought to secure at the time, or even rights 
they intentionally chose to omit.55 Through this approach, the Court has inter alia 
necessitated the legal recognition of the new identity of post-operative transsexuals;56 
prohibited practices denying maternal affiliation upon birth to children born out of wedlock;57 
and recognized the right not to be obliged to join a trade union.58  
This of course requires us to ask what was ‘exciting’ about the Court’s approach in 
Demir and Baykara? The answer can be found in Lörcher’s analysis. He argues that the 
innovative characteristic of the case is the ‘consolidation of the interpretation method based 
on a systematic and unprecedented breakdown of the related international labour standards’.59 
He proceeds to comment that, normally, where the Court interpreted rights enshrined in the 
Convention, it used to rely on the living-instrument approach construing rights in a way that 
renders them ‘practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory’60. However, the systematic 
reliance on external instruments gave the Court’s methodological approach a novel 
																																																																																																																																																																								
doctrine that seeks to protect a wider range of fundamental rights, which the Convention’s drafters would not 
have thought to secure at the time, or even rights that they intentionally chose to omit.  
52 ILO Convention 98; ESC, art 6; CFREU, art 28. 
53 See Siliadin v France App no 73316/01 (ECHR, 26 October 2005). 
54 Tyrer v United Kingdom App No 5856/72 (ECHR, 25 April 1978) [31]. 
55 For a thorough analysis of the ‘living-instrument’ approach see George Letsas, ‘The ECHR as a Living 
Instrument: Its Meaning and its Legitimacy’ (March 2012) 
<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2021836> accessed 07 August 2016. 
56 Goodwin v United Kingdom App no 17488/90 (ECHR, 27 March 1996). 
57 Marckx v Belgium App no 6833/74 (ECHR, 13 June 1979). 
58 Young, James, Webster v United Kingdom App no 7601/76 (ECHR, 13 August 1981). 
59 Lörcher (n 48) 10. 
60 ibid.
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dimension.61 Thus, the new approach lies in the words 'systematic and unprecedented 
consolidation'. Never before had the Grand Chamber dedicated so much time and space in the 
course of acknowledging the specific role played by instruments such as ILO Conventions 
and the ICESCR in an overall ‘internationally friendly interpretation’.62 Accordingly, ‘the 
ESC and ILO fora were no longer procedures for promulgating grievances and causing some 
gentle diplomatic embarrassment for domestic authorities, rather they constitute authoritative 
instruments that the Court will look upon in interpreting article 11 ECHR.’63 
Even though the ruling in Demir and Baykara generated a wave of enthusiasm 
amongst workers and trade unions, it also created concerns regarding the legitimacy and the 
limits of the Court’s interpretation, as a treaty-based authority. For instance, Jacobs maintains 
that in its future jurisprudence regarding the right to collective bargaining, the Court should 
not aim at a harmonisation of the domestic legislation on collective bargaining, since 
industrial structures between the Council of Europe member states are essentially non-
equivalent, having emerged from diverse historical backgrounds; hence, certain aspects of 
trade union interests should be left to the discretion of national authorities.64 Of course such 
an argument cannot be considered as an actual disagreement with the Court’s ruling, but 
rather as an acknowledgment of the existing difficulties towards a uniformity of industrial 
relations based on relevant international standards. 
Moreover, it has been stressed by the Turkish authorities65 that the Court went too far 
in its application of the living-instrument approach, and accordingly in its social construction 
of the ECHR. This statement is based on the notion that the primary objective of the 
Convention concerns the protection of civil and political entitlements. Such an argument is 
highly unconvincing. Apart from the fact it is against the very notion of the indivisibility and 
interrelation of human rights, no limitation whatsoever is to be traced in the Preamble of the 
Convention, which prohibits such a ‘social interpretation’.66 As O’Cinneide states, ever since 
the case of Airey v Ireland,67 the Court has both recognized the 'permeability' of civil/political 
																																																						
61 ibid. 
62 ibid. 
63 Ewing and Hendy (n 3) 6. 
64 Antoine Jacobs, ‘Article 11 ECHR: The Right to Bargain Collectively under Article 11 HER’ in Filip 
Dorssemont and Klaus Lörcher and Isabelle Schomann, The European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Employment Relation (Hart 2013), 314–315. 
65 See for example the Turkish Government’s Preliminary Objections in (n 7) [53]–[58]. 
66 The first and the second recitals of the ECHR’s Preamble make an explicit reference to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which makes no distinction between human rights. 
67 Airey v Ireland App no 6289/73 (ECHR, 9 October 1979). 
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and social rights and the Convention’s social dimension.68 The Court often applies what 
Mantouvalou calls, an ‘integrated’ approach when interpreting conventional rights;69 a 
method predicated on the interdependence and indivisibility of human rights. Civil and 
political rights cannot be fully enjoyed if socio-economic norms are not preserved; it would 
be socially unjust and seemingly unprincipled for the Court to adopt a dynamic interpretation 
towards specific rights and not to do the exact same thing with respect to other entitlements. 
After all, as Sir Nicolas Bratza puts it, due to the Court’s evolutive interpretation, ‘the 
Convention becomes not a dead letter, but the vital and living-instrument it was always 
supposed to be’.70  
 
C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE JUDGMENT IN DEMIR AND BAYKARA V 
TURKEY ON THE RIGHT TO STRIKE 
Jacobs mentions that ‘for the evolutive interpretation, the sky is the limit’.71 The Court, with 
its decision in Demir and Baykara seemed to embrace this view, despite accusations of 
‘judicial activism’. It was confirmed for the first time that the right to collective bargaining, 
in principle, is one of the vital elements of the right to form and to join a trade union. In doing 
so, it paved the way for equal protection with respect to other forms of trade union activity, 
particularly the right to strike.72 
The Court’s evolutive interpretation approach became apparent once more, some 
weeks later, in Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen. In that case, individuals employed in the public sector 
were banned from participating in a national one-day strike organised to defend collective 
bargaining rights. The Second Section of the Court, relying on the methodological framework 
set out in  Demir and Baykara re-iterated the view that ‘strike action, which permits a trade 
union to express their concerns, is an essential feature in the protection of trade unions’ 
members interests’.73 It went on to state that the right to collective action is protected by 
international specialised instruments, such as the ILO Convention 87,74 and despite the fact it 
is not an absolute entitlement due to the permissibility of certain restrictions under article 
																																																						
68 Colm O’Cinneide, ‘The Social Dimension of ECHR Rights: escaping the Dead Hand of Orthodoxy’ in Josep 
Casadevall and Nicole Lehner and Natalie Donath (eds), Mélanges en l’honneur de Dean Spielmann - Essays in 
Honour of Dean Spielmann (Wolf Legal Publishers 2015) 330. 
69 Virginia Mantouvalou, ‘Labour Rights in the European Convention on Human Rights: An Intellectual 
Justification for an Integrated Approach to Interpretation’ (2013) 13 HRLR 529. 
70 Sir Nicolas Bratza, ‘Living-instrument or dead letter - the future of the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ (2014) 2 EHRLR 119. 
71 Barrow (n 60) 310. 
72 Ewing and Hendy (n 3) 2. 
73 Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen (n 8) [24]. 
74 ibid. 
DOI: 10.14324/111.2052-1871.082 
 
 153 
11(2) ECHR, an indiscriminate prohibition is an undoubtedly illegitimate and 
disproportionate act. So, according to Fabbrini, it is now confirmed that the right to collective 
bargaining and the right to collective action constitute ‘two sides of the same coin’: trade 
unions are awarded with actual bargaining power only to the extent to which they have the 
choice to strike action to bolster their assertions; in that way, preservation of a right to 
bargain collectively by necessity implies protection of the right to collective action.75 
Not even some of the most optimistic legal practitioners could have predicted the 
Court’s labour-friendly departure from its previous line of jurisprudence in the decisions in 
National Union of Belgian Police and Schmidt. Yet, a flaw in the Enerji decision can be said 
to exist in the Second Chamber’s hesitation to qualify the right to strike as constituting an 
essential aspect in the protection of the interests of trade unions, rather than merely an 
important facet thereof. Writing at that time, Ewing and Hendy describe this position as 
purely explanatory of the fact that there are other means by which trade unions can safeguard 
their 'well-being'.76 This disinclination could be more problematic than it may seem at first. 
This is related with the limitations permitted on the right to strike under the scope of article 
11(2) ECHR. Particularly, it could be argued that the Court may be prepared to conduct more 
intense scrutiny when examining prohibitions or limitations placed upon essential trade union 
activities, as opposed to merely important means. Equally, restrictions and bans on an alleged 
essential method could be perceived less 'necessary' in a democratic society. In fact, this 
semantic difference can prove detrimental to the protection of the right to strike, as becomes 
evident below.  
Nevertheless, after its decision in Enerji, the Court continued to embrace its labour-
friendly path in subsequent cases; the position of trade unions and individual workers within 
the context of the Convention was enhanced, especially in those contracting states currently 
endowed with a very obstructive regulation of the right to strike. This was apparent in two 
rulings against the same state, namely Saime Özcan v Turkey77 and Kaya and Seyhan v 
Turkey.78 Both cases concerned public servants who were sanctioned in different ways due to 
their participation in strike actions. In Saime Özcan, a school teacher was prosecuted for 
having abandoned her workplace and was sentenced to three years and ten days 
imprisonment, commuted to a substantial fine; in Kaya and Seyhan two secondary school 
teachers received disciplinary warnings. The two cases can be distinguished in relation to the 
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harshness of the sanction, as consequences for Ms Özcan were much more severe than the 
sanctions for the other two applicants. In both instances, the Court did not hesitate to repeat 
that a disproportionate interference with trade union freedom of association constitutes an 
infringement of article 11 ECHR, even where it is simply capable of discouraging individual 
workers and trade unions from taking part in industrial action.79 Especially in Kaya and 
Seyhan the Court seemed to depart from prior judgments such as UNISON: relatively less 
onerous restrictions on the right to strike were not justified under article 11(2) of the 
Convention. This, however, does not suggest that all related actions taken by an employer 
will constitute a violation of article 11.80 Still, the various developments were unpredictable.  
The significance of the recent judicial developments regarding labour entitlements 
under the Convention lies in the explicit recognition of the right to collective action; a right 
inextricably linked to the right to bargain collectively. Without a doubt, this acknowledgment 
signifies a great improvement in the preservation of European collective rights. This is to say 
that trade unions and individual workers no longer need to prove that they do not have any 
alternatives to protect their interests, as an interference with the right to collective action 
alone suffices in order to trigger article 11 ECHR protection.  
Before proceeding to the next section, the following briefly summarises some of the 
main concerns in relation to the Court’s construction of article 11 ECHR with regard to what 
may prove detrimental for the protection of the workers’ right to strike. First, as indicated, the 
Court left the question as to whether such a right constitutes an essential rather than an 
important facet of article 11 open after Enerji. Its reluctance to give a clear answer to this 
question could lower the protection of collective action. In addition, it generates the 
following confusion: while the right to collective bargaining is an ‘essential’ feature of article 
11, the right to strike is merely protected as an important element thereof. This hardly makes 
sense, as the Court has also accepted the right to strike as the corollary to collective 
bargaining. So why does the Court persist in not giving an answer to this inconsistency? 
This issue is related to a second set of concerns, namely, the disagreement vis-à-vis 
the status of the right to strike within the ILO’s instruments. It is now well-established that 
the standards enshrined within the ILO’s jurisprudence to a substantial extent have been 
transferred into the decisions of the ECtHR. As mentioned, Convention 87 does not 
encompass any reference to the right to strike and from the history of its development it can 
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be stated that the negotiating states deliberately embraced this omission.81 Despite this 
absence, the ILO’s supervisory bodies, namely the Committee of Experts (‘CoE’) and the 
Committee on the Freedom of Association (‘CFA’) have now read the right to strike into the 
texts of Convention 87,82 by consistently emphasizing that it is inherent to the right to 
freedom of association covered under the ILO; a position that has been confirmed by 
Strasbourg.  
As Velyvyte asserts, in reacting to the 'activism' of the supervisory bodies, the ILO’s 
Employer’s Group has repeatedly challenged that the right to strike is enshrined in 
Convention 87.83 They argue that even though it is plausible to interpret Convention 87 as 
protecting the right to strike, nevertheless, the CoE and the CFA should not infer – due to its 
initial absence – from the text of Convention 87, ‘a global, precise and detailed, absolute and 
unlimited right [to strike]’.84 The conflict climaxed in 2012, during the International Labour 
Conference when the Employer’s Group refused to engage in any discussion on some of the 
most serious breaches involving the right to collective action; hence the Conference’s 
procedures 'fell into the abyss'.85 
Let us contend that such disputes within the most specialised-authoritative UN 
institution concerning labour rights could also have a negative effect as far as the relevant 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR is concerned. This occurs because the Court’s dynamic 
interpretation is and will continue to be based upon the status of the right to strike within the 
ILO Convention.86 Accordingly, the absence of consensus concerning the scope of the latter’s 
protection could also call into question the legal basis of the ECtHR’s interpretation and in 
turn its own credibility as a human rights court. As such, it could be assumed that the Court’s 
reluctance to qualify the right to strike as 'essential' for the purposes of article 11 ECHR can 
be, amongst other reasons, attributed to the internal disputes within its main authoritative 
source with regard to labour entitlements. Detrimental consequences for the protection of the 
right to strike materialized from these concerns in the recent case of RMT v UK,87 where the 
Court seemed to temper its position on the preservation of the right to collective action. 
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D. THE CASE OF RMT V UNITED KINGDOM: THE ‘HANGOVER’ OF THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS? 
Hangovers and blackouts can reduce the ability of the brain to form long-term memories. The 
causes are more or less well-known and no further explanation is needed. It would be fair to 
ask how the word 'hangover' relates to the ECtHR and its jurisprudence. Professor Ewing 
employed this word, likening the ruling of the RMT case to a person that experiences the 
effects of ‘hangover’.88 He explained that the Court seemed to have partially forgotten its 
previous promising jurisprudence. Indeed, the Court in RMT appeared ‘to misplace the 
optimism’ the cases of Demir and Enerji generated,89 in a highly problematic judgement 
regarding the protection of the right to collective action.  
The case involved two specific issues, namely the complex balloting provisions trade 
unions have to comply with before a strike action takes place, and the blanket ban of 
secondary or solidarity strike actions. Before examining this case in more depth, some 
information with respect to the status of the right to strike in the UK is useful. In the UK there 
has never existed any positive right to strike or other similar actions, and any such act has 
always been potentially unlawful at common law, under one or other of the ‘economic torts’, 
like conspiracy or inducement to breach a contract.90 In other words, as Maurice Kay LJ 
emphasized, this right in the UK ‘has never been more than a slogan or a legal metaphor. 
What has happened is that … legislation has provided limited immunities from a liability in 
tort’.91 Consequently, industrial action might be restricted by an injunction brought by the 
employer, who may also be able to claim damages for their losses. That said, one might argue 
that the ECtHR would be less tolerant towards the UK’s strike laws which have been 
constantly the subject matter of criticism by authoritative labour law institutions, like the ILO 
and ESC.92 Likewise, the Court’s stringent approach in a series of cases against Turkey, 
another state with many restrictions on strike law, was relatively fresh. 
Yet, as Bogg and Ewing assert, Strasbourg seemed to give with the one hand and take 
with the other: even though it reiterated that the right to strike is clearly protected under 
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article 11 ECHR, the decision reduced the scope of its protection.93 As stated, the case 
concerned two specific complaints. In relation to the pre-industrial notices that are necessary 
in escaping tortious liability, RMT members sought to challenge the granting of an injunction 
to inhibit their union from calling industrial action. At issue was the trade union’s failure to 
act in accordance with the ballot notice provisions, which required the union to give to the 
employer sufficiently detailed information on the groups of those workers expected to 
participate in the strike action. This failure resulted in the employer being awarded an 
injunction permitting him to restrict the strike action. The union corrected its initial mistake 
and after re-balloting it gave to the employer its renewed notice. The collective action 
ultimately took place. The Court, ‘in a sole paragraph striking for its briefness’,94 found that 
this complaint was ‘manifestly ill founded’,95 hence this limb of the claim was deemed 
inadmissible. It asserted that the union was not restrained as far as the strike action was 
concerned; it did not suffer any loss, and therefore no breach of article 11 of the Convention 
occurred.96 Disappointingly, as Barrow emphasizes, the Court’s superficial analysis resulted 
in its failure to engage in any consideration of the injunction’s impact on the activities of the 
trade union.97  
It is contended that the Court’s attitude in this regard was problematic for various 
reasons. First, as a matter of fact, the effects of the injunction were detrimental in the sense 
that the union incurred costs of £87,000 to defend its actions in domestic courts.98 It had also 
suffered a considerable delay while the re-balloting procedure took place, depriving the union 
of its initial tactical advantage.99 Secondly, as a matter of law, the Court’s 'poor' explanation 
appeared to come into contrast with its previous jurisprudence on the restrictions on the right 
to strike. It is recalled that in the earlier case of Kaya and Seyhan a disciplinary warning to 
two secondary school teachers was considered as discouraging the applicants from engaging 
in a one day strike action; hence, it was not justified under the restrictions of article 11(2) 
ECHR. Furthermore, in the pre-Demir case of Wilson, it was held that the relevant industrial 
law of a state should not dissuade workers from using their trade union to represent them for 
matters regulating their relations with their employers.100 Still, in RMT the obstacles imposed 
																																																						
93 Alan Bogg and Keith Ewing, ‘The Implications of the RMT Case’ (2014) 43 ILR 221. 
94 ibid 231. 
95 RMT (n 86) [45]. 
96 ibid. 
97 Barrow (n 88) 278. 
98 RMT (n 86) [53]. 
99 ibid. 
100 Barrow (n 88) 232. 
DOI: 10.14324/111.2052-1871.082 
 
 158 
upon the trade union were not deemed sufficient to trigger the applicability of article 11(1). 
As Ewing and Bogg argue, it is difficult to understand how ‘the labyrinthine notice 
provisions conditioning the legality of strike action in the UK, along with the costs and the 
practical disadvantages followed due to the injunction, did not constitute an impediment 
discouraging the union’s ability to safeguard its members’ interests’.101 It is indeed peculiar 
that a disciplinary warning in Kaya and Seyhan had not been justified under article 11(2), 
whilst the restrictions at issue could not fall within article 11(1). It will not come as a surprise 
therefore that the Court, once again, avoided qualifying the right to strike as an essential 
aspect of article 11. This may be deemed indicative of the fact that the Court’s reluctance is 
not purely descriptive as to the existence of other methods by which trade unions can protect 
their interests, as previously discussed. If, in its earlier case-law, the Court had seized the 
opportunity to qualify the right to strike as an essential rather than an important feature of 
article 11, it is possible that the UK’s legislative restrains on industrial action would more 
likely be construed as violating the Convention. 
The second aspect of the case concerned the removal of tortious immunity from 
industrial action in solidarity (or sympathy). In particular, some of the trade union’s 
members, working for Fastline Ltd (part of the Jarvis plc group), were transferred to Hydrex 
Equipment Ltd, in order to perform the exact same job (rail engineering), with terms 
conserved under Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 
(‘TUPER’).102 The problems arose as soon as their protection under TUPER expired; as a 
result, their remuneration reduced to the levels of other workers in the enterprise. Although 
they went on strike, they were unable to persuade the employer to address their concerns due 
to their lack of industrial power – just 20 members strong. What was even more frustrating 
for the transferred workers was that the trade union they belonged to was unable to call for a 
secondary action either at Fastline Ltd, or Jarvis plc, in order to support them at Hydrex; s 
224 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 provides that all 
solidarity actions are unlawful. As such, any attempt to resort to sympathy action would have 
render the statutory immunities inapplicable.103 Thus, the trade union initiated proceedings 
before the ECtHR, claiming that the domestic regulations on secondary strikes had a 'chilling 
effect' on their power to protect its transferred workers.  
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To begin with the ‘labour-friendly’ aspect of the case, the ECtHR acknowledged the 
existence of an implicit right to secondary action which is preserved under the ambit of 
article 11. In coming to this conclusion, the Court referred to other international instruments 
and the decisions of international supervisory bodies, as well as common practices of the 
ECHR’s states parties. For instance, both the provisions of the ILO and ESC enshrine this 
right as part of the wider right to strike.104 But the Court classified it as an 'accessory' rather a 
core feature of trade unions’ right to associate thereby reducing the level of protection 
afforded to it.105 A wider margin of appreciation was given to the UK in the determination of 
the issue under article 11(2). The UK authorities stressed that solidarity strikes should be 
strictly limited, because they could potentially damage the economic recovery of the country 
by disrupting its economic process.106 In seeking to justify this, the UK also cited statistics in 
relation to the negative financial impacts the strike caused, but it did not proceed to any 
division between primary and secondary action. Barrow argues that the information given by 
the government was highly unconvincing since there was no proof that the consequences of 
the action in question were so detrimental for third parties and the economy as a whole. The 
Court accepted these arguments and found that the blanket prohibition of secondary actions 
was proportionate and necessary in a democratic society in pursuing the legitimate aim of 
preserving the rights and freedoms of others not engaging in the dispute. In other words: 
although the UK’s blanket ban on secondary action was a very restrictive measure compared 
with the position in other parties of the Convention, that it did not by itself indicate that in 
regulating this aspect of trade union activity it had inevitably exceeded its wide margin of 
appreciation.107 Thus, this interference did not violate the right to strike.  
It is surprising that the ECtHR accepted the UK’s arguments and upheld a wide 
margin of appreciation. It did not examine the costs that a blanket prohibition could have on 
the trade unions’ legitimate activity to protect the interests of their members, especially when 
they are participating in industrial action and supplementary pressure is a useful bargaining 
tool. In doing so, as Barrow mentions, the Court disposed of two key factors that have played 
a prominent role in its previous jurisprudence: the conformity of the measure with European 
labour standards and the principles deriving from related international instruments.108 It 
argued that the assessment of the legal matters was particular to the circumstances of the 
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case; the supervisory bodies’ approach regarding the ban on secondary action was not 
persuasive, as the issue was examined only in exceptional situations.109 It was held that the 
ILO’s jurisprudence was limited to situations where the ban of solidarity actions was deemed 
to make it easier for the employers to take advantage of the law in question.110 This could 
occur ‘where there is a very high degree of proximity between a “primary” and a “secondary” 
employer (for example, by outsourcing work to another enterprise)’.111 According to the 
Court this scenario did not apply to the very facts of RMT; Hydrex Enterprise Ltd and Jarvis 
Ltd were genuinely distinct entities and as such there was no 'abuse' of powers on the 
employer’s part.   
Bogg and Ewing characterised these findings as ‘unsupportable’, due to the Court’s 
restrictive interpretation.112 They argued that the ILO’s supervisory bodies have also 
espoused a broader approach regarding the protection of solidarity action by highlighting its 
importance in situations where it has been used to assist foreign workers to secure their 
entitlements, or in supporting multi-employer collective bargaining.113 Thus, it could be 
stated that the Court adopted a 'pick and choose' stance, by construing the ILO’s 
jurisprudence in a rather restrictive manner. Such behaviour comes into contrast to the 
approach adopted in Demir and Enerji where the principles enshrined in international 
supervisory bodies had been construed in an expansive way based on their systematic 
breakdown. At this point, Ewing’s 'hangover' characterization is relevant. The Court seemed 
to forget its labour-friendly approach and, in ‘light of the breadth of the margin of 
appreciation in this area’,114 it paid lip service to the principles and jurisprudence of 
specialised institutions.  
Yet, this was not the only problem as far as the ruling is concerned. As seen, the Court 
has classified secondary action as an 'accessory’ rather than a core aspect of trade unions’ 
activities. It is true that this distinction resembles to a certain extent the division that has been 
drawn with respect to the primary right to strike within the Convention, ie it is an important, 
rather than essential feature of article 11 ECHR. Having already expressed a view on the 
latter distinction, it is arguable that the legal implications for characterising secondary action 
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as an 'accessory' are indeed problematic as they indicate the narrow scope of protection 
afforded. The term 'accessory' can be defined as something which ‘contributes to or aid an 
activity or process in a minor way; subsidiary or supplementary.’115 While it would be 
difficult for someone to disagree over the definition of the word, many have expressed their 
dissent regarding the categorisation of solidarity actions as 'accessorial' to the rights to 
bargain collectively and strike. For instance, it has been said that solidarity has been central 
to the philosophy of both the socialist and labour movements.116 Within the labour context 
this has been confirmed by the International Trade Union Confederation which adopted a 
Declaration of Principles that inter alia states: ‘The Confederation … is committed to provide 
practical solidarity to all in need of it, and to confront the global strategies of capital with 
global strategies of labour.’117 This is also apparent as many of the European states reserve 
some space of legality for secondary actions in their labour policies, apart from the UK of 
course.118 As such, solidarity actions should be extended as widely as possible to right-
holders and particularly to those individuals who have been excluded from the enjoyment of 
their entitlements. After all, solidarity within secondary actions is one of the most important 
words in the language of the workers and its restricted protection within the Court’s 
jurisprudence is indeed problematic for an effective protection of the right to strike. But what 
is even more worrying is the Court’s general approach in RMT.  
Several concerns exist. The most significant relate to the future protection of the right 
to strike within the ECHR. The Court’s rulings in the Demir and Enerji cases are recent and 
well-established, but their 'legacy' neither prevented the Court from finding against the 
problematic UK’s balloting provisions in RMT, nor anticipated offering a narrow protection 
regarding secondary actions. Thus, in considering the outcome in RMT, some might stress 
that the protection of the right to strike within the legal framework of the Convention can be 
inadequate. The next section will engage with such considerations by highlighting the 
importance of the right to strike for human rights in general.  
 
E. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AS A HUMAN RIGHT 
AND ITS FUTURE PROTECTION UNDER THE ECHR: AN ENHANCED OR 
SUPERFICIAL PROTECTION? 
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It has long been acknowledged that labour rights are human rights,119 ‘even though the 
human rights movement and the labour movement run on tracks that are sometimes parallel 
and scarcely meet’.120 As Leary points out, historically, trade unions and other labour rights 
institutions inclined to monopolising inquires of workplace justice, while human rights 
organisations tended to focus instead on political and civil rights matters.121 Nonetheless, the 
tracks have recently started to converge with trade unionists and labour lawyers now using 
the rhetoric of human rights to enhance their claims. Collective labour rights are enshrined as 
individual rights in human rights treaties but as seen ‘are there with the purpose to assist 
people pursue collective and solidaristic objectives’.122 This is also the case with the right to 
strike. 
Much of the discussion regarding the protection of the right to strike has been 
concentrated on its impact on workers’ interests. It is undeniably an essential facet of the 
right to freedom of association, as without it the right to collective bargaining would be a 
rather 'weak' process, where the employer would have the upper hand in determining the 
working rules and conditions. Its primary function is the promotion of social and political 
entitlements enshrined in international human rights law. This for instance includes the right 
to decent remuneration; strike action can also be carried out to ensure that their right to safe 
and healthy working conditions is respected.123 
 Still, the impact of industrial actions is not confined to situations where purely labour 
interests are at stake. As Ewing states, many of the significant right to strike cases in 
domestic courts are identified as human rights cases, even though they are not articulated as 
such.124 Notably, in some of these cases the right to strike was brought to the fore as the 
means of giving effect to the enjoyment of civil and political rights. For example, this has 
become apparent in instances where the right to freedom of conscience was involved (by 
rejecting the idea to undertake obligations that offend the worker’s conscious beliefs),125 or in 
cases where the freedom of expression was exercised (as a means of expressing support or 
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opposition to a specific method implemented either by the government at issue or the 
employer).126 This is not to imply that all strike actions have the purpose of promoting human 
rights when the employment conditions at issue transgress the minimum standards set out by 
international instruments. Nevertheless, as Ewing claims, in situations where national laws 
and practices fail to fulfil these duties, ‘it is hard to deny that a strike to increase the standards 
of some workers to these international minimum prerequisites is an industrial action designed 
to promote and establish human rights’.127 In the absence of any legislative obligation 
imposed on the employer, strike action might be the only resort for individuals and trade 
unions to safeguard the human rights that their government failed to enforce, despite its 
international obligations.128 This underlines the importance of qualifying the right to strike as 
a human right. 
Finally, the importance of the right to strike can be illustrated through a third 
perspective, which is equally important. Particularly, the effects of a strike action can be 
expanded to human rights holders who are not taking part in the action in question, ie to third 
parties. This can occur where one group of workers may go on strike in an attempt to secure 
the reinstatement of workers fired due to their trade union activity; or where a trade union 
may boycott a specific place of work because it discriminates between domestic and migrant 
workers. In both situations the element of solidarity is essential for the promotion of human 
rights. Thus, both primary and secondary strike actions play a vital role in the comprehensive 
protection of the right to strike.  
To summarise, in view of the significance of the right to strike, it could be stated that 
its adequate protection could have as a result not only the protection of those formally 
engaged in the dispute but also the preservation of the rights and freedoms of others. The 
question that then arises is whether the ECtHR can rely on the legacy of Demir and Enerji to 
adequately protect such rights, or whether the most recent developments of RMT case render 
these expectations impossible? 
1.  The current developments and the increasing ‘hostility’ towards labour rights: The 
ECtHR as the guardian of the right to strike? 
At the European level, workers are now entitled to organise strikes with the view of 
preserving their economic, social and union-related interests. In recent years, the ECtHR’s 
contributions to this have been remarkable, although not flawless. However, in many respects 
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the battle is not yet over. The right to strike cannot be seen solely through a Convention 
standpoint, but needs to be assessed in accordance with the current (neo)liberal developments 
in the European terrain.  
What began as a meltdown of the global financial system during the period of 2007-
08 has now taken the form of a new economic and political reality of austerity policies, which 
according to many commentators jeopardizes the enjoyment of human rights generally, and 
socio-economic rights in particular.129 Indeed, since 2010, austerity has become the ‘only 
game in town’.130 The present-day attention is on new economic governance activities and the 
subjection of labour rights in general to more closely coordinated national economic 
arrangements. The latter have been presented as part of the Europe 2020 growth strategy, 
with the scrutiny and surveillance of national economies.131 Perhaps the greatest impact of 
these measures is the coordinated attack on collective bargaining structures and as an 
immediate result on strike actions. For instance, the levels of strike activity in the UK in 
recent years have fallen to their lowest for over a century;132 in Finland, after the crisis was 
declared, the number of illegal strikes has soared;133 while in Greece the recent Law	
3899/2010creates a number of additional requirements regarding industrial actions that can 
only be met by trade unions with great difficulty.134  Although a full account of the 
consequence of the financial crisis on the right to strike is beyond the scope of this article, it 
can be stated that the plethora of measures adopted by the majority of European states poses a 
real threat to the enjoyment of workers’ entitlements and consequently to the right to strike.  
Apart from the detrimental effects of the 'great recession' on industrial actions, the 
treatment of the right to strike by the EU has also been problematic and contested. As Novitz 
argues, within the EU ‘the trend has been towards not positive protection, but rather the 
exercise of EU powers to negate access to strike actions.’135 She argues that this may be a 
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response to the fact that workers’ industrial activity can reduce the exercise by market entities 
of the commercial freedoms under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(‘TFEU’).136 This became apparent in the infamous Viking137 and Laval cases.138 Despite 
acknowledging the significance of strike actions as a means of preserving workers’ interests, 
the Court of Justice (‘CJEU’) held that such a right could and needed to be balanced against 
the commercial principles of the European economic institution. Consequently, the right to 
strike was constrained in a manner unprecedented in the domestic constitutional orders. By 
applying a proportionality test which asked whether the economic freedoms enshrined in EU 
law could be justifiably limited by the right to strike, the CJEU seemed to be prioritising 
economic freedoms over fundamental rights.139 Thus, where collective actions are at stake, it 
seems to depart from the principle provided in article 53 CFREU which provides that: 
‘Nothing in this Chapter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights 
and fundamental freedoms as recognised … by Union law and International Law …’, 
including article 11 ECHR.140 According to Davies, this reflects the fact that the CJEU 
regards its own role as one of preserving and encouraging the Community’s laws 
fundamental principles which include economic freedoms.141  
Although briefly analysed, the current developments within the European context 
appear to be somewhat hostile towards the exercise of the right to strike. The current austerity 
measures implemented as a response to the financial crisis, along with the problematic rulings 
of the CJEU pose an immediate threat on the enjoyment of the right in question. For this 
reason, many authors have stressed that accession of the EU to the ECHR, as required by 
article 6(2) Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’),142 might offer an enhanced protection for 
human rights, including for the right to strike. Yet the CJEU’s Opinion 2/13 – which found 
the draft agreement for accession incompatible with EU law – indicates that this will not take 
place any time soon. So where does this leave the protection of the right to strike? 
The ECtHR should be, and has the potential to be, the 'guardian' of this right. The 
rulings in Demir and Enerji constitute the best demonstration of this. These ground-breaking 
decisions were celebrated not solely by Turkish trade unions but also by a plethora of 
workers and human rights advocates across Europe. It might be argued that the ECtHR has 
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diminished cause for such celebrations in RMT, raising doubts as to whether it had regretted 
its previous decisions. Nonetheless, this may not be the case. Recently, in Hrvatski Lijecnicki 
Sindikat,143 it was held (in a concurring opinion) that the right to strike constituted the ‘the 
most powerful instrument of trade unions to protect their occupational interests of their 
members’.144 Thus, it essentially acknowledges the right to strike as an essential facet of 
article 11 ECHR. The shift from the Court’s stance in RMT might be explained as a 
consequence of extra-judicial considerations. Jacobs states that the Convention ‘has come 
into dire straits over the past number of years, and the case law of the ECtHR is no longer the 
subject of widespread appreciation’.145 Some decades ago, labour lawyers discouraged their 
clients from bringing their claim on the right to strike in front of the ECtHR. This is not the 
case anymore. The Strasbourg Court, regardless of errors, can be perceived as the ‘guardian’ 
of human rights, including the right to strike.  
 
F. CONCLUSION 
This article has sought to provide a systematic analysis of the right to strike as protected by 
the ECHR. This analysis is premised on the suggestion that the right to strike constitutes one 
of the most essential means by which workers can safeguard their interests. Initially the 
ECtHR failed to recognise such a right, generating a sense of despair among trade unions and 
labour lawyers. However, in the landmark Enerji case, the Court effectively reversed its 
stance and, by relying on international specialised instruments like the ILO Conventions 87 & 
98, has now acknowledged that the right to strike is inextricably linked to the right to bargain 
collectively; hence, it is protected under the Convention. But the Court hesitated to qualify 
the right to strike as an essential rather than a merely important aspect for the protection of 
the interests of trade unions. This enabled the decision in RMT which raised questions 
regarding the level of protection afforded to the right to strike.  
The recent case of Hrvatski Lijecnicki Sindikat provided some clarification: the right 
in question was held to be the most essential means in the hands of trade unions in preserving 
their members’ work-related interests. It thus demonstrated, it is submitted, that the Court can 
comprehensively protect the right to strike. In the context of economic crises and the CJEU’s 
hostile approach to industrial action, such protection is all the more necessary. It remains to 
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be seen whether the ECtHR will continue, by relying on the legacy of Demir and Enerji, to 
maintain its enhanced protection of the right to strike. 
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